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CASENOTES

THE "SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST" FOR
CAUSATION: JUEDEMAN V. MONTANA
DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER
Randall C. Lester
I.

INTRODUCTION

A critical issue in any negligence action is the determination of
whether the defendant's act is reasonably connected to the plaintiff's injury.1 More aptly put, causation is a necessary element of
any negligence case.2 Although causation is usually framed in
terms of proximate cause,3 Montana has recently recognized the
"substantial factor" test as an alternative." The substantial factor
test was not introduced to abolish proximate cause, but to offer an
alternative test under certain factual circumstances. In Juedeman
v. Montana Deaconess Medical Center,5 the Montana Supreme
Court affirmed a district court decision refusing to instruct the jury
as to the substantial factor test. The purpose of this case note is to
examine the recent Juedeman case and other related decisions,
and to analyze those circumstances which will allow the use of a
substantial factor instruction.
II. BACKGROUND

For the purpose of instructing the jury on causation, a proximate cause definition is ordinarily considered appropriate.' A standard instruction on proximate cause states: "The proximate cause
of an injury or damage is that cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new or independent cause, pro1. W. PROSSER & P. KEATON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
Mont. _,
2. E.g., R.H. Schwartz Constr. Specialties, Inc. v. Hanrahan, __
672 P.2d 1116, 1117 (1983) (stating "it is axiomatic that negligence requires the existence of
a duty, a breach of that duty and harm caused by that breach").
3. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
709 P.2d 621, 628 (1985); Kyriss v. State,
4. Rudeck v. Wright, - Mont. -,...
__
Mont. .,
-, 707 P.2d 5, 8 (1985). It should be noted that the terms "substantial
factor" and "legal cause" are often used interchangeably. For purposes of uniformity, the
term "substantial factor" will be used throughout this note.
5. Mont. ,726 P.2d 301 (1986).
6. Rudeck, - Mont. at __,
709 P.2d at 628.
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duces the injury or damage, and without which it would not have
occurred." 7 Bench and bar commonly refer to proximate cause as
the "but for" test.' According to the "but for" test, "[t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have
occurred but for that conduct; or conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred
without it."
An unjust result may occur if the jury is instructed in terms of
the "but for" test when two causes concur in producing an injury
and when either cause alone would have been capable of causing
the same injury.1 0 In this situation, a tortfeasor might successfully
argue that the same injury would have occurred despite his negligence. 1 This potential problem may be best illustrated by the use
of an example: 2 motorcycle drivers X and Y simultaneously drive
by an individual riding a horse. The horse is frightened by the excessive speeds and close proximity of the motorcycles and throws
the rider, injuring him severely. Although the acts of both X and Y
are responsible for the injury, it cannot be said that the injury
would not have occurred "but for" each of their acts. In other
words, X could argue he was not the proximate cause of the injury
because the same injury would have occurred despite his negligent
act, and Y would advance the same argument. As a result, both or
all defendants may avoid liability because the "but for" test can
logically absolve them all.
Use of the substantial factor test would avoid such a result. A
common jury instruction implementing the substantial factor test
states: "A legal cause of an injury is a cause which is a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury. '"" Montana recently recognized
the use of such an instruction when two or more factors may be
substantial causes of the plaintiff's injury.
In Rudeck v. Wright," the Montana Supreme Court approved
of the above stated substantial factor instruction. Prior to Rudeck,
there were indications that a substantial factor instruction would
7. Id.
8. Rudeck, - Mont. at -,
709 P.2d at 628. See also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON,
supra note 1, § 41.
9. Rudeck, - Mont. at __, 709 P.2d at 628.
10. Id. at -, 709 P.2d at 628.
11. See Kyriss, Mont. at __,
707 P.2d at 8.
12. W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 1, § 41 (implementing the facts of Corey v.
Havener, 182 Mass. 250, 65 N.E. 69 (1902)).
13. See Juedeman, - Mont. at -,
726 P.2d at 305; Kyriss, - Mont. at -,
707 P.2d at 7; Rudeck, Mont. at -,
709 P.2d at 628. See also CALIFORNIA JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 3.76 (7th ed. 1986); and, MONTANA PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, No. 2.07 (1987).
14. __
Mont. __,
709 P.2d 621.
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be appropriate under proper circumstances. 5 However, Rudeck is
the first Montana case to expressly approve such an instruction.1 6
The Rudeck decision was the result of a medical malpractice
claim in which the defendant surgeon failed to remove a piece of
surgical gauze, a lap mat, from his patient.1 7 Two surgical nurses
assisted the surgeon during the operation and were responsible for
the lap mat count.' Following the operation, the patient's health
was poor and he failed to recover in a satisfactory manner. Still
under the care of the operating physician, the patient was referred
to a radiologist who failed to detect the presence of the lap mat
despite the fact that x-rays revealed the lap mat's presence.' 9 Approximately five months after the operation, the patient died due
to complications caused by the lap mat. In a subsequent trial
against the operating surgeon,2 0 the court allowed a substantial
factor instruction. The jury found against the operating surgeon.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court approved of the
instruction.
The court preferred the substantial factor test because more
than one cause concurred in causing the decedent's death.2 The
court stated that the substantial factor rule was not intended to be
a permanent replacement for the traditional proximate cause rule.
Instead, the court reasoned that the proximate cause rule was inapplicable under the particular facts of the case.2 2 However, the
appropriateness of the substantial factor rule in Rudeck is debatable since the court excluded evidence of concurrent negligence by
the surgical nurses and evidence of subsequent negligence by the
radiologist.2 3 The court held "that such evidence was irrelevant
during the trial on the issue of whether [the operating surgeon's]
15. See Moen v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 201 Mont. 425, 441, 655 P.2d 482, 490
(1982).
16. Although Montana case law has phrased the traditional proximate cause test in
various ways, causation tests prior to Rudeck appear to always include the "but for" test in
one form or another. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Phalen, 182 Mont. 448,
460, 597 P.2d 720, 726-27 (1979); Bensley v. Miles City, 91 Mont. 561, 567, 9 P.2d 168, 171
(1932).
Mont. at -,
709 P.2d at 623.
17. Rudeck, 18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Prior to trial, the radiologist and hospital negotiated a settlement with the plain, 709 P.2d at 624.
tiff. Id. at 21. Id. at __, 709 P.2d at 628-29.
Mont.
22. Id. at __, 709 P.2d at 629. See also Dvorak v. Matador Serv., Inc., __
727 P.2d 1306, 1311 (1986) (holding that a demonstration of proximate cause is
, -,
a necessary element of a strict liability claim).
Mont. at , 709 P.2d at 627-28.
23. Rudeck, -
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negligence caused the injury and death of [the patient]. 2 4 Nevertheless, Rudeck held the substantial factor test was the proper test
under the circumstances at hand.
In Kyriss v. State,2" the court made it clear that causation
would not always be determined in terms of proximate cause. The
Kyriss decision was also the result of a medical malpractice case in
which a prison inmate at the Montana State Prison consulted a
prison, physician regarding an ingrown toenail on his right foot.2"
After removal of the toenail, the patient's foot failed to heal and
contracted an infection. As the condition grew steadily worse, the
patient consulted with the prison medical staff on a substantial
number of occasions. 27 Still, the patient's condition continued to
decline and approximately 3 1/2 months following the operation, it
became necessary to amputate the lower portion of the defendant's
right leg. 28 In a later medical malpractice trial, the jury was instructed as to the substantial factor test and entered a verdict
against two prison physicians. 29 On appeal, the use of the instruction was affirmed.
The majority in Kyriss reasoned that the factual situation was
well suited for a substantial factor instruction because there were
two causes which may have concurred in producing the injury and
either cause acting alone could have caused the same injury.3 0 The
defendant argued that the actual cause of the amputation was a
pre-existing condition of arteriosclerosis in the patient's right leg
31
and that the amputation would have been necessary in any event.
In contrast, the plaintiff alleged the amputation was caused by
negligent medical treatment. In affirming the use of a substantial
factor instruction, the court reasoned a proximate cause instruction would be inadequate and stated:
Under the "but for" rule, it could be argued, and indeed was
argued in the district court and here on appeal, that the amputation would have occurred in any event, and not only "but for" the
negligent treatment by the doctors.
If two causes concur to bring about an injury and either
cause would have been sufficient for the result, some test for tort
liability other than the "but for" rule is needed. In the case of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at __,
__
Mont.
Id. at
Id. at __
Id. at
Id. at__
Id. at __
Id. at

709 P.2d
707
707 P.2d
707 P.2d
707 P.2d
707 P.2d
707 P.2d
707 P.2d

-

at 628.
P.2d 5 (1985).
at 9.
at 9-11.
at 11.
at 6.
at 8-9.
at 9.
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two such concurring causes, the proximate cause instruction fails
because a jury so instructed would face an impossible task: It cannot then find the negligence of one party a cause "without which
the injury would not have occurred." It was in grappling with this
facet of tort causation that courts developed the "substantial factor" test.2
The "but for" test would have allowed the physicians to argue
that even if their treatment was negligent, they were not the proximate cause of the amputation. In effect, the substantial factor test
removed this defense. Importantly, Kyriss recognizes that a substantial factor instruction is appropriate if an injury may have
been substantially caused "by two or more actors or factors."3 3
Therefore, use of the instruction is not always limited to instances
where there are two or more tortfeasors responsible for the injury.
Following the logic of Kyriss, a pre-existing condition acting alone
with the negligence of a single tortfeasor is sufficient.
Other jurisdictions have previously recognized the substantial
factor test in one form or another.3 4 Currently, there is no doubt
that Montana also recognizes the use of the substantial factor test
if the appropriate circumstances exist. The vital current issue,
therefore, is what circumstances will permit the use of a substantial factor instruction.
III.

JUEDEMAN V. MONTANA DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER

A.

Facts and Procedure

On June 5, 1981, Clarice Juedeman was convalescing at the
Montana Deaconess Medical Center. 5 She was 71 years old and
recovering from colon surgery performed nine days earlier. At the
time of surgery, a catheter was inserted in her right internal jugular vein. 6 The catheter served several purposes, including feeding
707 P.2d at 8 (quoting Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault St.
32. Id. at __,
Marie Railway Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45, (1920) aff'd., 185 N.W. 299 (1921)).
33. Id.
34. Although it is difficult to determine a precise majority/minority rule, it is clear
that a number of jurisdictions recognize a similar form of the substantial factor test. See
Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 163, 486 P.2d 151, 158, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 630 (1971); McGee
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 190-91, 188 Cal. Rptr. 542, 550-551 (1983);
LeJeune v. Allstate Ins, Co., 365 So. 2d 471, 477 (La. 1978); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 418, 528 P.2d 522, 543 (1974); Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis.
Mont. __I
2d 607, 617, 292 N.W.2d 630, 636 (1980). See also Streich v. Hilton Davis, 692 P.2d 440, 450 (1984) (Morrison, J., concurring) (stating "[aill legal authorities now
-,
recognize that, where there are concurrent causes, a legal cause [substantial factor] instruction should be given").
Mont.....
726 P.2d 301, 302 (1986).
35. Juedeman, 36. Id.
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and medicating the patient. 7 Under the orders of her attending
physician, the catheter was removed on June 5, 1981.38 Shortly
thereafter, Clarice Juedeman became comatose and died eleven
days later.3
The personal representatives of Clarice Juedeman's estate
brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Montana Deaconess Medical Center.40 The plaintiffs' primary contention was that the hospital negligently removed the catheter." Expert testimony indicated that Juedeman possibly suffered an "air
embolism" at the time of removal.4 2 Simply stated, an air embolism is caused when a small amount of air enters the circulatory
system at the point of removal and eventually travels to the brain
causing severe damage to the patient.4 3 The defendant contended
that pre-existing conditions caused Juedeman's death. Juedeman
was diabetic and suffered from hypertension and atheroscleratic
heart disease.4 5
The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendant negligently removed the catheter because of the patient's upright position at the time of removal. Expert testimony indicated the
chances of an air embolism are greater if the patient sits upright at
the time of removal.4 6 However, evidence also demonstrated that
other surgeons do not suggest placing the patient in a flat position. 7 Witness testimony conflicted as to whether the patient was
sitting upright48 or in a semi-reclined position. 49 An additional
question of fact was the length of time between the catheter removal and when the patient displayed adverse symptoms. If the
injury was caused by an air embolism, the symptoms would be apparent within one minute of removal.5 0 Witness testimony conflicted as to this point and indicated the time lapse may have been
as short as 30 seconds,51 or as long as ten minutes.52 A time lapse
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

47.

Id.
Id. at

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

at
at
at
at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

726
726
__, 726
-,
726
__, 726
, 726

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at
at
at
at
at
at

301-02.
306.
304.
306.
305.
304.

726
726
-,
726
-,
726
__, 726

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

at
at
at
at
at

302.
303.
304.
302.
303.

__,
-,

-,

__,
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of longer than one minute would preclude the possibility of an air
embolism."3
Following the presentation of evidence, the court denied the
plaintiff's proposed substantial factor instruction."' Instead, a
traditional proximate cause instruction was utilized.5 5 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the hospital." The plaintiffs appealed
from the adverse verdict and contended that the substantial factor
instruction should have been given.
The plaintiffs' theory suggested that the proximate cause instruction might allow the defendant to escape liability even if the
catheter was negligently removed. Plaintiffs argued that two causes
may have concurred in bringing about the injury: (1) the patient's
pre-existing condition; and, (2) the negligent removal of the catheter.5 7 If both causes concurred in causing the injury and either acting alone could have caused the same injury, neither cause could
be termed a proximate cause under the given definition because
the definition requires that a proximate cause be one "without
which [the injury] would not have occurred." 8 Following this logic,
it was conceivable that both possible causes might be excluded
from the realm of proximate cause.
B.

The Court's Opinion

In a 5-2 decision, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decision, holding that the substantial factor instruction was properly denied."' The Juedeman court distinguished
Kyriss because it found no evidence demonstrating two concurring
causes which produced the injury.6 0 The majority stated that it was
a proper function of the trial court to determine whether the facts
of the case warranted the use of a substantial factor instruction. 1
Judge Gordon R. Bennett authored a dissenting opinion," in
53. Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 304.
54. Id. at __,
726 P.2d at 305 (the substantial factor instruction stated: "[a] legal
cause of an injury is a cause which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury").
55. Id. (The proximate cause instruction stated: "[t]he proximate cause of an injury is
that cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces the injury, and without which it would not have occurred").
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at
, 726 P.2d at 307.
60. Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 306-07.
61. Id.
62. Id. at
,726 P.2d at 308 (Bennett, J., dissenting) (Judge Gordon R. Bennett sat
for Justice Hunt).
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which Justice Morrison concurred." In contrast with the majority,
Judge Bennett believed that the evidence may have suggested two
concurrent causes." Therefore, he concluded the plaintiff was entitled to a substantial factor instruction, along with additional instructions explaining the substantial factor test."
C. Analysis and PracticalImplications
The crucial factor in Juedeman was the majority's belief that
it was "not a case in which two causes concurred or might have
concurred to bring about the condition of the patient and in which
either one of them operating alone would have been sufficient to
cause the identical result."66 Instead, the majority believed that
the record suggested the injury was caused by either the patient's
pre-existing condition or the removal of the catheter. Either cause
may have been responsible, but the majority saw no evidence that
both acted concurrently. This view placed the facts of Juedeman
in direct contrast with the facts of Kyriss, where the court did find
that two causes may have concurred in causing the injury. 7 Therefore, the majority reasoned the substantial factor instruction was
properly denied under the facts contained in the record.
The court offered some guidance in determining the role of the
trial judge by adopting section 434 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.6 Under that section, the trial judge determines whether
there is a reasonable issue of fact for the jury to decide in terms of
substantial factor. Since the majority believed the evidence in
Juedeman presented no reasonable issue of fact as to whether two
Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 310 (Morrison, J., concurring).
Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 309 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
Id. at -,
726 P.2d at 309-10.
Id. at __, 726 P.2d at 306.
Id. at __,
726 P.2d at 307.
The entire section reads as follows:
Functions of Court and Jury. (1) It is the function of the court to determine
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury
may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two
or more causes; and
(c) the questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the
jury may not reasonably differ.
(2) It is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in which it may
reasonably differ on the issue,
(a) whether the defendant's conduct has been a substantial factor in causing
the harm to the plaintiff, and
(b) the apportionment of the harm to two or more causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 454.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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causes concurred in causing the injury, it was appropriate for the
trial judge to refuse a substantial factor instruction. This follows
the general rule that "[a] trial judge will not be held in error for
refusing to give instructions . . .where it is not applicable to the

evidence .

"...-69

Juedeman helps define when a substantial factor instruction
will be allowed. Although it is difficult to completely reconcile
Juedeman with Kyriss and Rudeck, certain guidelines have
emerged which help to clarify when the substantial factor test is
appropriate. First, the record must demonstrate that the injury
was caused by two or more causes acting in a concurrent manner.
Juedeman does not alter the holding of Kyriss, in that one of the
causes may be a pre-existing injury. Therefore, the causes must
have a concurrent effect, but need not occur simultaneously in
time. Second, although not an issue in Juedeman, the court adheres to the requirement that either cause, acting alone, be sufficient to cause the same injury.7" Undoubtedly, this must also be
reflected in the trial record.
Two additional factors should be considered as persuasive.
First, the substantial factor test was initially "developed primarily
for cases in which application of the 'but for' rule would allow each
defendant to escape responsibility because the conduct of one or
more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result."7 A persuasive argument for the use of a substantial factor
instruction exists if the "but for" test may unjustly allow a defendant relief from liability solely because some other tortfeasor or
cause would have brought about the same result. This is essentially
what the substantial factor test is designed to avoid. Secondly, if
the case involves multiple tortfeasors or causes, a substantial factor
instruction may communicate the element of causation to the jury
in a more precise and comprehensible manner. Courts and commentators have noted the confusion which is often caused by the
concept of "proximate cause. ' 7' A substantial factor instruction
helps to remove this needless confusion in cases involving multiple
tortfeasors or causes.
69. Doble v. Lincoln County Title Co.,
- Mont.
692 P.2d 1267, 1271
(1985) (citing Wollan v. Lord, 142 Mont. 498, 504, 385 P.2d 102, 106 (1963)).
70. Juedeman, - Mont. at -, 726 P.2d at 306.
71. Rudeck, - Mont. at -,
709 P.2d at 628.
72. See, e.g., State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 176 Cal. App. 2d
10, -,
1 Cal. Rptr. 73, 80 (1959) (stating "[t]he concept of proximate causation has given
courts and commentators consummate difficulty and has in truth defied precise definition").
See also W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 1, § 42.
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CONCLUSION

The "substantial factor" test is now recognized as part of
Montana tort law. However, it is not intended to permanently
abolish the traditional proximate cause rule and a litigant is entitled to a substantial factor instruction only if certain circumstances exist. The required circumstances were recently Yiewed
fairly strictly in Juedeman, and they must be supported by the
trial record.
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